A Philosophical Analysis of the Bangsamoro Autonomy Act 64 Using Wittgensteinian and Habermasian Perspectives

Abstract

This study provides a rigorous philosophical examination of the legislative language embedded within the Bangsamoro Autonomy Act No. 64 (BAA 64) and its impact on the recognition and rights of Non-Moro Indigenous Peoples (NMIPs). By employing a conceptual discourse analysis rooted in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Language-Game Theory and Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action, the research systematically evaluates the law's semantic and procedural dimensions. Findings reveal that the BAA 64 suffers from critical semantic ambiguity, forcing a singular, state-centric legal framework over distinct indigenous cultural concepts and diluting their meaning. Furthermore, the study identifies severe procedural ambiguity, noting that the law's drafting favored dominant political structures over genuine, uncoerced communicative rationality. To address these shortcomings, the study proposes normative guidelines—semantic pluralism, dialogical formulation, contextual clarification, and ethical communication—emphasizing that marginalized groups must be treated as co-authoring subjects of legal discourse.