A Conceptual Synthesis of China's Peaceful Policy, Tolerance, and the Logic of Non-Provocative Defence

Abstract

This conceptual synthesis analyses the interplay between China's declared policy of peaceful development, the notion of strategic tolerance, and the pragmatic rationale of non-provocative defence. Utilising defensive realism, security dilemma theory, deterrence theory, and just war traditions, the analysis assesses a series of propositions derived from a practitioner-oriented defence document. The synthesis contends that China's stance (prioritizing non-intervention, mutual respect, and the prevention of nuclear escalation) does not exclude but rather necessitates credible, low-cost territorial defence mechanisms. Three fundamental assertions are integrated: firstly, that China's peaceful policy fulfils both normative and strategic roles in a multipolar context; secondly, that tolerance, when accurately interpreted, represents a calculated restraint aimed at averting catastrophic conflict rather than indicating weakness; thirdly, that essential, geographically tailored defence measures (including natural barriers, water obstacles, missile interception systems, and minimal submarine-based deterrence) can deter potential aggressors without instigating arms races. The analysis reveals substantial deficiencies: the lack of empirical validation, insufficient operational specifics concerning "low-cost" defence architectures, unresolved conflicts between tolerance and effective deterrence, and the scarcity of quantitative data. The synthesis concludes by delineating a research agenda for defensive realism amid escalating great-power competition.